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Abstract: The goal of this paper is to investigate the relationship between corporate 
governance quality and capital structure of a firm. Survey sample consists of 799 listed 
companies in 9 Eastern European countries. OLS regression is done with book and market 
leverage as dependent variables and a corporate governance index constructed by the 
authors serves as the main explanatory variable. Other control variables, mostly positions 
and ratios from financial statements, are also used. The regression models with market 
leverage as dependent variable have larger explanatory power than models with book 
leverage. The results of the survey reveal negative relation between corporate governance 
index and market leverage, which means the higher level of corporate governance, the 
lower level of debt. Other existing empirical findings from other countries show various 
conclusions – some similar, some – contrary to this survey, and some have inconclusive 
results. 
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Introduction  
In recent decades, corporate governance issues become more and more important 
and discussed in stock valuation. It is said better corporate governance can add to 
firm's market value. Also, level of leverage may significantly influence the view 
how the equity-holders see company's value and riskiness.  
A company’s capital structure is the proportional combination of equity and debt 
that is used to finance its business activities. It is possible to choose a particular 
level of debt in the capital structure at which company’s value is maximized and 
the financing cost (WACC – weighted average cost of capital) is minimized.  
Because debt limits managerial flexibility (Jensen, 1986), a particular focus of the 
research has been on the importance of managerial objectives in financing 
decisions. (Morellec, 2010). Thus, corporate governance is viewed as a broad 
discipline that influences profitability and value of companies, and an instrument to 
obstruct agency conflicts. Because corporate governance is designed to align the 
managers’ interest with shareholders', a well-functioning corporate governance 
system would make the manager move leverage toward the shareholders’ desired 
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level rather than toward their own desired level (Liao, 2015). Firms with weak 
governance may render their companies safe by adopting more conservative 
investment policies (e.g., John et al. 2008; John, 2010). 
There are various studies seeking the interrelation between corporate governance 
and capital structure. Nevertheless, only few of them include the broad spectrum of 
corporate governance issues, e.g. Jiraporn et. al. base their study on corporate 
governance standards of Institutional Shareholder Services which include 51 
factors divided in 8 corporate governance categories: audit, board of directors, 
charter (bylaws), director education, executive and director compensation, 
ownership, progressive practices, and state of incorporation (Jiraporn, 2012).   
Board independence is viewed as a crucial factor for effective monitoring of 
management (Liao, 2015). Thus, for good corporate governance, the separation 
between CEO and board chairman and a high proportion of independent directors 
are recommended.  
Morellec, Nikolov, and Schurhoff (2012) find that, on average, managerial delta is 
positively associated with the manager’s private benefits of control, concluding 
that the entrenchment effect outweighs the incentive effect. 
The empirical evidence also shows inverse relationship between leverage use and 
governance quality (Jiraporn et.al. 2012) – firms with weaker governance are 
significantly more leveraged.  
Institutional and cultural specificities may affect financing policy and capital 
structure so dramatically that systematic differences across countries might exist 
(Gaud, 2010). This explains different and sometimes contrary results of various 
studies using different geographical samples. Country-specific factors may have 
explanatory power similar to or even greater than that of the company’s industry 
affiliation in determining a company’s capital structure. Tradition, tax policy, and 
regulation may largely explain the different degrees of leverage in the two 
countries. (Fan, Titman, and Twite, 2004). Companies in developed markets 
typically use more long-term debt compared to companies operating in emerging 
markets. Internationally, factors that explain most capital structure differences are 
institutional and legal system, size, liquidity and activity of capital markets, and 
overall economic environment. 
Motivation for this study was driven by the fact that, so far, there are no such broad 
studies about the relationship between corporate governance quality and capital 
structure in Eastern European countries. 
Literature Review 
A broad scientific discussion regarding the capital structure began with Modigliani-
Miller (MM) theory in late 50-ties. Although many of the assumptions of 
Modigliani and Miller are empirically unrealistic, their theory provides the basis 
for thinking about and analyse capital structure as such. MM theory uses the 
concept of arbitrage and argues that, taking into account the assumptions (MM 
theory assumptions: homogenous expectations; no taxes; no transaction costs; no 
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bankruptcy costs; perfect information; financing at risk-free rate; no agency costs 
and independent financing decision (Modigliani, Miller, 1958)), the total market 
value of a firm is independent of its capital structure, but only in no-tax case (MM 
Preposition I without taxes (MM Proposition I: The market value of a company is 
not affected by the capital structure of the company (if no-tax assumption holds))). 
Here, managers cannot create company’s value by simply changing its capital 
structure, as the value is solely determined by its cash flows.  
According to MM Preposition II without taxes (The cost of equity is a linear 
function of the company’s debt-to-equity ratio (MM Proposition II without taxes, it 
states that higher financial leverage raises the cost of equity)), the cost of equity 
increases to offset the increased use of comparatively cheaper debt (due to having 
the prior claim to assets and income) in order to maintain a constant WACC. 
Adding leverage does increase the risk faced by the shareholders (holders of 
equity). In such a case, shareholders seek compensation by requiring a higher 
return for this extra risk. Basically, shareholders bear two types of risk – business 
risk concerning business operations, and financial risk related to the degree of 
financial leverage.  
Tax regimes may affect capital structure via the tax shield, and add to company 
value (MM Proposition I with taxes) and decrease cost of equity (MM Proposition 
II with taxes) (Modigliani & Miller, 1963). However, Miller (1977) shows that 
once personal taxes are taken into account, depending on the tax rates involved, 
debt may add little value, if any, to the firm. 
In practice, the value of a levered company is affected by other important factors, 
such as cost of financial distress and asymmetric information, and agency costs. 
These issues give basis for the research developed in other theories – agency, static 
trade-off and pecking order theories. 
Since the early 70-ties, agency theory has been developed. It posits that agency 
costs influence capital structure decisions. Additional risk related with increase in 
debt (and thus bankruptcy risk) is to be assumed to motivate managers to reduce 
the agency costs and increase efficiency. According to agency theory, because 
leverage imposes constraints on managerial discretion, managers might be 
motivated to adopt sub-optimal leverage (Jiraporn et.al. 2012). Managers issue less 
debt and restructure less frequently than is optimal for shareholders. The greater 
the severity of agency conflicts, the lower is the manager’s desired leverage level, 
and the slower it moves toward the shareholders’ desired level (Ryoonhee, 2011). 
Michael Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis states that higher level of debt 
disciplines firm managers to manage the company efficiently so it can make 
enough interest and principal payments to the debtholders. Additionally, the 
company’s free cash flow (According to M. Jensen, free cash flow is cash flow in 
excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net present values 
when discounted at the relevant cost of capital) is reduced. That diminishes 
management’s opportunities to misuse cash (Jensen, 1986). This effect appears to 
be even stronger in the emerging markets (Harvey, Lins, Rooper, 2004). From the 
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other side, the level of debt becomes a governance device due to informational 
asymmetries and divergences in the utility functions of stakeholders (Gaud, 2007). 
Harvey et al. (2004) find that actively monitored debt (syndicate loans) benefits 
firms with high expected managerial agency costs (John, 2010). Providers of both 
debt and equity capital demand higher returns from companies with higher 
asymmetry in information because they have a greater likelihood of agency costs. 
Companies with comparatively high asymmetry in information are those with 
complex products like high-tech companies, companies with little transparency in 
financial accounting information, or companies with lower levels of institutional 
ownership.  
According to agency theory, key characteristics of the firm that represent agency 
costs affect leverage and managerial compensation in opposite directions 
(Ryoonhee, 2011). 
The traditional view of the optimal capital structure is that a firm should increase 
the portion of debt until its WACC is minimized, and therefore its enterprise value 
is maximized. However, there is a trade-off between the incremental tax benefits 
and increasing bankruptcy risks (Duff, Phelps, 2016). The static trade-off theory is 
related to determining optimal capital structure, and its main idea is that there is a 
point beyond which effects of increasing financial leverage are offset by the value 
reducing effects. At the point of optimal capital structure, the value of the company 
is maximized. The value enhancing effect is the effect from tax deductibility of 
interest. The value reducing effects are costs of financial distress or bankruptcy; 
agency costs of debt, and asymmetric information.  
The static trade-off theory is contrary to Modigliani and Miller Proposition I and II 
without tax of no optimal capital structure. Nevertheless, the optimum level varies 
for each firm depending on its business risk, taxation policy, and corporate 
governance.  
The optimal financing policy consists in making adjustments toward the target debt 
level provided that deviation costs exceed adjustment costs (Gaud, 2007). 
According to the static trade-off theory, a firm maximizes the wealth of its 
shareholders when its capital structure reaches the optimal level via a trade-off of 
tax benefits against financial distress costs of debt. Any deviation from optimal 
leverage should be removed quickly (Liao, 2015). 
Pecking order theory, developed by Myers and Majluf (1984), suggests that the 
financing choice of managers depends on information content preference, from 
lowest (most preferable) to highest (least preferable). Accordingly, managers prefer 
internal financing the most, then debt, then equity. The second criterion that 
influences issuance of equity is stock value – managers tend to issue equity when 
they believe the stock is overvalued and vice versa.  
A study of micro, small and medium-sized companies in Central and Eastern 
Europe has found strong evidence in favour of the pecking order theory. However, 
the theory works better for larger companies more often having enough internal 
capital to fund their investment projects (Mateev, Poutziouris, Ivanov, 2013).  
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Results of the research of Gaud, et.al. (2007) indicate that neither a simple pecking 
order model nor a simple trade-off model is sufficient in understanding financial 
policy; they also highlight that agency and timing issues impact upon capital 
structure. They document that the financing process is complex and dynamic. In 
terms of debt ratios, they find that firms constrain themselves to an upper barrier 
only (Gaud, 2007). 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 3, sample selection 
and methodology is presented. Section 4 introduces the results concerning 
descriptive statistics and correlations. Section 5 presents the OLS regression results 
of data analysis. Finally, Sections 6 and 7 contain concluding remarks and 
discussion respectively. 
Methodology 
The original sample includes cross-sectional data from listed companies from 
Eastern-European countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovak Republic) in 2016. Before trimming the 
survey sample consisted of 1,676 firms. Data from several sources of information 
were used the financial data came mainly from Thomson Reuters database but 
unfortunately they do not have enough data regarding corporate governance in the 
companies from the selected countries. Some financial figures were missing as well. 
Thus, the authors manually gathered the corporate governance (CG) information 
from individual homepages of each company. Use longer time frame was also 
considered, but due to limited availability of CG data it was not possible. Financial 
institutions and companies were excluded from the sample as due to their work 
specifics and special regulation their leverage cannot be interpreted in the same 
way as for firms operating in other industries. Also, firms lacking data for the 
survey were excluded (data were not available neither on Thomson Reuters 
database, nor individual homepage). After trimming, the survey sample comprises 
data from 799 firm observations. 
The dependent variable in the survey is leverage, measured by book leverage (BL, 
i.e., the book value of total liabilities to value of total assets at the end of the 
current fiscal year) and market leverage (ML, i.e., the book value of total liabilities 
to market value of assets at the end of the current fiscal year. We calculate market 
value of assets by book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market 
value of common equity plus preferred stock if such exists).  
The independent variable is corporate governance, measured by CG index. As was 
already mentioned, gathering corporate governance data was very time and labour 
intensive. For most companies the information was not offered by Thomson 
Reuters platform. Thus, the information had to be found in individual homepages 
of the selected companies. Data items were limited to such variables as whether 
CEO-chairman separation (CEO_SEP) exists (dummy variable: if separation exists, 
a company gets 1, if not – 0); number of board members; and number of 
independent board members (N_IND).  
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In order to measure corporate governance, the idea applied in other surveys (see, 
for example, Briano-Turrent and Poletti-Hughes, 2017; John 2010; Chung et. al., 
2010; Brown and Caylor 2006; Gompers et al. 2003) was used, and the authors of 
this article constructed their own simplified corporate governance index (CG 
index): 
                                                 
                                        
Based on existing empirical research regarding capital structure, some control 
variables were used in this survey:  
- natural logarithm of assets (LN_A) as a proxy for firm size;  
- fixed assets ratio (FAR); book value of property plant and equipment to assets 
is used to proxy for tangible assets;  
- EBIT ratio (EBIT) for profitability and operating performance (earnings before 
interest and tax to total revenue). In order to avoid highly extreme values due 
to negligible amount of revenue and existing (positive or negative) profit, 
EBIT ratio values greater than ±10 were excluded;  
- in order to correct leverage measures for cash, variable of cash to total assets 
(C/A) was added in the set of explanatory variables. It is the ratio of natural 
logarithm of cash and cash equivalents to total assets; 
- as an explanatory variable to proxy for non-debt tax shield, the ratio of 
depreciation and amortization (D&A) to book value of total assets (DA/A) was 
included. According to Jiraporn et.al. 2012, firms with lower non-debt tax 
shield are expected to have lower levels of debt;  
- dividend payout ratio (DPR), as dividends often influence firm’s leverage 
choice;  
- research and development expenses (R&D), if these expenses are missing, the 
item is recorded as 0; 
- price-to-earnings ratio (P/E), calculated by stock price divided by earnings per 
share. 
Descriptive statistics and Correlations 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics (number and share of firms in the sample 
and mean values of the selected ratios) of industry distribution by the sample. Both 
leverage ratios and the CG index by industry were analysed. The healthcare 
industry has the lowest level of book and market leverage, and it represents 5% of 
the total sample, while industrials and consumer non-cyclicals have the highest 
levels of market and book leverage respectively. Concerning governance index, the 
technology sector has the strongest governance and consumer non-cyclicals – the 




POLISH JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES 














Basic Materials 108 13.5 0.537 0.237 0.695 
Consumer Cyclicals 195 24.4 0.464 0.319 0.709 
Consumer Non-Cyclicals 97 12.1 0.495 0.322 0.609 
Energy 37 4.6 0.500 0.219 0.616 
Healthcare 40 5.0 0.317 0.155 0.717 
Industrials 210 26.3 0.568 0.233 0.677 
Technology 61 7.6 0.397 0.227 0.834 
Telecommunications Services 15 1.9 0.468 0.232 0.728 
Utilities 36 4.5 0.511 0.200 0.777 
Total 799 100.0 0.496 0.284 0.699 
Table 2 presents number and share of firms in the sample and mean values of 
selected ratios by country. The authors find the lowest market and book leverage 
ratios in Czech Republic and Latvia, while the highest – in Slovak Republic and 
Hungary respectively. The strongest governance scores are found in Poland and 
Estonia; the weakest – in Bulgaria and Romania. This partially may be explained 
by the fact that Polish and Estonian listed companies have the highest level of 
CEO-chairman separation variable, while many Bulgarian and Romanian firms still 
operate under one-tier management system, thus not having separate management 
and supervisory boards. For example, Nedelchev mentions that although the 
country legislation has provided a choice between a one-tier and a two-tier system 
of governance, in practice, the one-tier system is preferred by state-owned 
companies and listed companies. The two-tier system – by foreign-owned 
companies and by financial intermediaries (Nedelchev, 2017). 
 






Book leverage CG index 
Bulgaria 152 19.0 0.556 0.240 0.289 
Czech Republic 10 1.3 0.393 0.191 0.723 
Estonia 14 1.8 0.439 0.206 0.875 
Hungary 28 3.5 0.524 0.405 0.557 
Latvia 26 3.3 0.550 0.176 0.755 
Lithuania 25 3.1 0.477 0.230 0.682 
Poland 428 53.6 0.460 0.281 0.905 
Romania 103 12.9 0.534 0.223 0.451 
Slovak Republic 13 1.6 0.682 0.365 0.684 
Total 799 100.0 0.496 0.284 0.699 
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Table 3 summarizes descriptive statistics of the total sample – mean values; 
standard deviation; minimum, maximum values; and we also split the sample 
observations by quartiles. On average, companies have 4-5 board members and 
most of them are independent. Also, about 2/3 of the sample companies have 
separate CEO and Board Chairman. The average book leverage or book debt ratio 
for the sample is 4.3% while average market leverage or market debt ratio is 
49.62%. On average, the sample companies have 27.6 million euros in assets. 
Average proportion of fixed assets comprises 35.7% of total assets. Mean 
profitability in terms of EBIT ratio is 16.4% (the sample results were adjusted for 
this ratio and minimum and maximum values for this ratio were set  ±10).  
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of the Total Sample  
 Mean St.dev. Min. 
Percentiles 
Max 
25 50 75 
Board size 4.36 2.561 0 3.00 5.00 6.00 18 
N_IND 3.96 2.486 0 2.00 5.00 5.00 16 
CEO separat. .633 .4822 0.0 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.0 
CG index .69873 .39675 0.000 .33333 1.00000 1.000 1.000 
Book leverage .54304 8.0649 0.000 .02665 .15767 .30296 227.251 
Market leverage .49624 .28751 0.000 .25593 .49055 .72625 1.000 
Ln(Assets) 17.135   2.193   7.372   15.829   17.201   18.449   23.876  
Fixed assets ratio .35726 .56009 0.000 0.000 .03767 .6223 6.337 
EBIT ratio -.164 1.601 -10.00 0.000 .0564 .139 10.00 
D&A/Assets .03554 .0479 0.000 .00909 .02561 .04605 .676 
Payout ratio .20824 2.0545 -7.988 0.000 0.000 0.000 50.757 
C/A -3.811 1.967 -12.377 -4.761 -3.521 -2.460 0.000 
R&D (Mil. EUR) 13.729  27.636 0.000  55.435  761.286  8.595 113.926 
P/E ratio -23.9 1,426.9 -36,631.6 0.9 8.5 16.8 13,528.8 
Table 4 shows the Pearson correlation matrix for the dataset variables. It reveals 
that CEO separation highly correlates with number of independent board members 
which reveals that companies that evaluate high corporate governance standards try 
to comply with at least several of them. The data in the table also reveal that both 
book and market leverage have low level of correlation with the other selected 
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_SEP BL ML 
CG 
index Ln_A FAR EBIT DA/A DPR 
B_size 1           
N_IND ,942** 1          
CEO_SEP ,441** ,569** 1         
BL .004 .011 .025 1        
ML -,164** -,160** -,151** ,081* 1       
CG index ,581** ,705** ,949** .024 -,172** 1      
Ln_A ,461** ,428** ,246** -,097** .011 ,288** 1     
FAR ,276** ,257** ,135** -.015 -.016 ,157** ,348** 1    
EBIT .047 .019 -,071* -.005 -.057 -.063 ,142** .025 1   
DA/A ,078* ,095** .056 -.002 -.022 .068 -.056 ,274** -.061 1  
DPR ,113** ,103** -.010 -.005 -.035 .011 ,123** ,093** .020 -.028 1 
C/A ,113** ,111** ,115** .055 -,223** ,113** -.019 -.020 .021 .045 .051 
R&D ,083* ,082* .045 -.004 -.057 .047 ,103** .038 .013 .012 .010 
P/E .058 ,076* .060 .000 .051 ,083* ,125** .026 -.014 .003 .048 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
(2-tailed). 
Abbreviations: B_size – board size; N_IND – number of independent board members; CEO_SEP – 
CEO separation; BL – book leverage; ML – market leverage; CG index – corporate governance index; 
Ln_A – natural logarithm of total assets; FAR – fixed assets ratio; EBIT – EBIT ratio; DA/A – 
depreciation and amortisation to total assets ratio; DPR – dividend payout ratio; C/A – cash and cash 
equivalents to total assets ratio; R&D – research and development expense; P/E – stock price to 
earnings per share ratio. 
 
Regression Results 
Next, regression of leverage ratios – book and market leverage – on a set of 
explanatory variables was accomplished. In table 5, the CG index serves as the 
main explanatory variable together with other selected control variables. 
The regression models with book leverage as dependent variable have little 
explanatory power and CG index coefficient value is not significantly different 
from zero. In Model 2, the natural logarithm of assets variable is significant. 
Nevertheless, testing the significance of the regression as a whole, the F test values 
indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of model variables being jointly 
equal to zero at 0.05 probability level.  
At the same time, regression models with market leverage as dependent variable 
have larger explanatory power. In all of them CG index value is significantly 
different from zero and the coefficients are negative, indicating that the higher 
level of corporate governance, the lower will market leverage be. According to F-
test values, we can reject the null hypothesis regarding all independent variables 
being jointly equal to zero. Natural logarithm of assets in models 5 and 6 has 
positive influence on market leverage, while EBIT ratio in models 5 and 6, and 
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Table 5. OLS Regression Results with Book Leverage and Market Leverage as 
Dependent Variables (N=799), Unstandardized Coefficients 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(Y) Dependent variable - book leverage Dependent variable - market leverage 
Const .201 8.591 1.184 .256 .400 .405 .290 .583 
 (.578) (2.552) (.886) (.621) (.083) (.086) (.087) (.020) 
CG index 
.490 1.041 .419 .552 -.145 -.143 -.122 -.124 
(.720) (.771) (.748) (.743) (.027) (.027) (.026) (.025) 
Ln_A  -.468   .012 .011   
  (.151)   (.005) (.005)   
FAR   -.229 -.276 -.005 -.001 -.006  
   (.545) (.544) (.019) (.020) (.020)  
EBIT    -.010 -.014 -.018   
    (.185) (.006) (.006)   
DA/A    .200  -.028 .038  
    (6.275)  (-.028) (.215)  
DPR  .014  -.013 -.006 -.006 -.004  
  (.141)  (.141) (.005) (.005) (.005)  
C/A  .198 .218    -.029  
  (.148) (.149)    (.005)  
R&D  5.986 -9.172 -7.053   -2.608  
  (53.84) (53.91) (53.93)   (1.829)  
P/E  .000 .000 .000  .000   
  (.000) (.000) (.000)  (.000)   
R .024 0.125 .061 .031 .204 .213 .297 .172 
Adj. R2 -.001 0.004 -.006 -.008 .035 .037 .078 .028 
F .463 1.391 .365 0.110 6.855 5.341 8.410 24.152 
sig. .497 0.188 .939 .998 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Discussion 
Modigliani and Miller in 50-ties raised the question regarding optimum leverage 
level and its effect on firm value. Today, this theory has been developed further 
and one of the aspects is to investigate leverage relation with corporate governance 
standards. Many other theories are interrelated with this issue, such as agency 
theory, pecking order theory and static trade-off theory. Nevertheless, no theory 
completely and conclusively reveals the evidence regarding the research problem. 
As in most countries loan repayments and interest are tax-deductible, many 
companies are seeking for optimal proportion of debt and equity financing.  
This paper investigates how corporate governance affects firm's capital structure in 
the listed companies of Eastern European countries. Using regression analysis, we 
find that corporate governance affects market leverage ratio negatively in the 
selected sample of 799 listed companies in Eastern Europe. It means that higher 
level of corporate governance gives lower level of debt. 
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The results of other recent empirical studies reveal various outcomes. Companies 
with poor level of governance are significantly more leveraged (Jiraporn et.al., 
2012). Liao et.al. find that managerial incentive compensation can discourage 
moving towards optimal level of debt by management, and they call it 
entrenchment effect (Liao et.al., 2015). At the same time, a study of listed non-
financial firms in Pakistani finds positive relationship between managerial 
ownership and capital structure (i.e., board size has a significant impact on debt-to-
equity ratio in positive direction) (Naseem et. al., 2017).  
There are studies finding inconclusive relationship between capital structure and 
corporate governance (see Goel and Sapra, 2015). Authors of a study about 
institutional quality on capital structure in firms from developing countries 
conclude that institutional quality has positive effects on debt ratios (Latin 
American and Eastern European sample containing data from two Eastern 
European countries – Poland and Turkey) (Matemilola et.al., 2019). 
This study expands the literature on corporate governance and capital structure.  
Conclusions 
The conclusion is that there may be other, probably country and firm specific 
factors, that may also influence the corporate governance and capital structure, and 
thus the relation between these two issues. Making great efforts to achieve good 
corporate governance is very important, but it is not the only solution for the 
problem of optimal proportion of debt and equity.  
The greatest limitation for this study was corporate governance data availability for 
a longer time period, and the quality and quantity of the available financial data. 
Thus, for deeper studies of corporate governance in Eastern European countries, 
there is a great need for high quality data availability about boards of directors and 
management, their independency, executive compensation and share ownership, 
etc. There is great space for improvement of data quality requirements for listed 
companies.  
Also, further studies are needed in the area of corporate governance and capital 
structure in Eastern European countries to increase availability of empirical results 
in this area.  
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STRUKTURA KAPITAŁOWA I ŁAD KORPORACYJNY: PRZYKŁADY 
SPÓŁEK DZIAŁAJĄCYCH NA WSCHODZIE EUROPY 
Streszczenie: Celem tego artykułu jest zbadanie związku między jakością ładu 
korporacyjnego a strukturą kapitałową firmy. Próbka ankietowa składa się z 799 spółek 
giełdowych w 9 krajach Europy Wschodniej. Regresja OLS odbywa się przy użyciu 
dźwigni księgowej i rynkowej jako zmiennych zależnych, a wskaźnik ładu korporacyjnego 
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opracowany przez autorów służy jako główna zmienna objaśniająca. Wykorzystywane są 
również inne zmienne kontrolne, głównie pozycje i wskaźniki ze sprawozdań finansowych. 
Modele regresji z dźwignią rynkową jako zmienną zależną mają większą moc wyjaśniającą 
niż modele z dźwignią księgową. Wyniki badania wskazują na negatywny związek między 
wskaźnikiem ładu korporacyjnego a dźwignią rynkową, co oznacza wyższy poziom ładu 
korporacyjnego, niższy poziom zadłużenia. Inne istniejące ustalenia empiryczne z innych 
krajów pokazują różne wnioski - niektóre podobne, niektóre - w przeciwieństwie do tego 
badania, a niektóre nie przynoszą jednoznacznych wyników. 




9 个东欧国家的 799 家上市公司。 OLS 回归是以账面和市场杠杆作为因变量来完成的
，而作者构建的公司治理指数是主要的解释变量。 也使用其他控制变量，主要是财务
报表中的头寸和比率。 以市场杠杆作为因变量的回归模型比具有账面杠杆的模型具
有更大的解释力。 调查结果显示公司治理指数与市场杠杆之间存在负相关关系，这意
味着公司治理水平越高，债务水平越低。 来自其他国家的其他现有经验发现也显示出
各种结论，有些与本次调查相反，有些与之相反，有些结论没有定论。 
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